From calls to convictions: The crucial role of mobile data in policing today

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April 20, 2024 | Matthew Rowles | Police1 |

Exploring how everyday mobile technology empowers law enforcement with tools to track, investigate and solve crimes through detailed call records and location data

Technology is a valuable tool at law enforcement’s disposal. According to Consumer Affairs Research Team, 97% of Americans own a mobile phone, which translates to about 325.4 million people. Additionally, 50.6% of the world’s internet traffic comes from mobile phones. According to the United States Census, the population of the United States is 335,917,563 people. We can all agree that no one leaves home without their mobile phone, so let’s use this to our advantage.

Each mobile phone must communicate with a mobile phone provider. Mobile phone providers have a vast network of cellular phone towers that are strategically located to provide uninterrupted communications (Remember the “Can you hear me now?” commercials). Providers store records, including Call Detail Records, Tower Information and Specialized Location Information, as business records.

Phone calls can be tracked through historical records, normally referred to as call detail records (CDR). These records include the date, time, duration of call, originating number, terminating number, identifiers for the target phone, and the specific cell tower and sector that the call connected to.

Consider the following:

Law enforcement is required to serve a search warrant upon the mobile phone provider to identify the phone number, or serial number, of the target device. The provider will provide several PDF and Excel documents that include the specific CDR information related to the target phone number. Cell towers are identified by an area code, address, or GPS coordinates (latitude and longitude).

The actionable evidence that can be translated from these records includes:

  • Incoming calls, outgoing calls, missed calls, voicemails, and text messages;
  • The target device’s most frequently called phone numbers;
  • Pattern of life;
  • Who the suspect or device was in contact with prior to, during, and after a crime under investigation;
  • Estimated location of the target device, and the target device’s direction from the tower;
  • And, the target device’s “home” or most used tower.

Cell tower sectors and crime solving
Each cell tower is divided into sectors. A cell tower may be divided into as few as three or as many as six sectors. Much like a pizza is divided into equal slices, cell tower sectors are divided into equal areas of coverage.

Suppose law enforcement has surveillance video of a suspect committing a crime, and a tentative identification of the suspect, which includes the suspect’s mobile phone number. Law enforcement may obtain a search warrant for the suspect’s cell phone records. Upon receipt of the records, law enforcement will be able to analyze them to confirm that, at the time the crime was committed, the suspect’s device was within the estimated cell tower sector covering the area where the crime was committed.

This information can be used to rebut the defense’s claim that the suspect was not in the area at the time the crime occurred. Additionally, location information records can be imported into a mapping program, such as Google Earth, where the specific locations of the target device are displayed for demonstrative purposes.

Case study
In April 2012, law enforcement responded to a homicide that occurred inside a barbershop. Through investigation, investigators learned that a lone actor entered the barber shop dressed in a woman’s “Niqab,” which concealed his body and face. The actor approached the victim, who was working inside. After approaching the victim, the actor drew a firearm, which was concealed under the Niqab, and shot the victim, execution style.

Investigators developed a suspect, who willingly met with them for an interview. During the interview, the suspect denied having any involvement in the murder. He claimed that he was at a different business, in the City of Philadelphia, at the time of the murder. The suspect was confident that investigators would believe his alibi; however, he was unaware that the investigators had done their homework.

Before the interview, investigators served a search warrant on the suspect’s mobile phone provider. Pursuant to the search warrant, the suspect’s mobile phone provider relinquished the suspect’s call detail records (CDR) to investigators. Upon reviewing the CDR, investigators were able to determine that, on the date and time of the murder, the suspect’s mobile device was connected to a mobile phone tower located across the street from the barbershop. Specifically, the mobile phone was utilizing the specific sector that serviced the area of the murder scene.

When the suspect provided investigators with his alibi, the investigators confronted him with the CDR evidence. After being confronted with the CDR evidence, the suspect confessed to the murder. Additionally, investigators prepared a map, containing the CDR data, and presented it at trial. Ultimately, the suspect was convicted of third-degree murder.

Using Call Detail Records (CDR) in criminal cases
Other valuable assets recorded by the mobile phone providers are Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Time-of-Arrival (TOA). Each mobile phone provider refers to TOA differently. TOA measurements relate to the time from the serving sector to the target device. This data is utilized by cellular phone providers for engineering and network optimization purposes. These records can be invaluable to a criminal investigation, and law enforcement can request them through a search warrant.

TOA records differ from CDR records. TOA records contain location-based data that can determine the distance of the mobile phone from the cell tower. TOA estimates the location of the target device using round trip delay measurement from the tower. Certain providers will supply a confidence rating in reference to the measurement of distance from the tower.

Location data can provide valuable information, such as:

  • Confirming that the suspect’s mobile device was in the area where a crime occurred;
  • Determining the location of the suspect’s phone prior to, during and after the crime occurred;
  • Confirming or disproving an alibi.

 

When a suspect uses the internet, or social media, to communicate, their device’s IP address is recorded. This type of communication does not require a phone number, but it does require an internet connection, either through WiFi or cellular service. Mobile providers assign an IP address to each mobile device that utilizes their cellular network. When a user accesses a social media account from their mobile device, the IP for their mobile device is recorded and stored by the social media application. Social media direct messages, such as iMessage, will not be displayed on CDR because they utilize a data connection, not the normal text messaging connection. When a legal process is served upon the social media application, law enforcement will obtain the IP address, which is associated with the communication. This IP address can be researched and traced back to a mobile device through the mobile phone provider.

Law enforcement can obtain subscriber information by obtaining a search warrant for an IP address. Law enforcement can input an IP address on certain websites, such as https://www.iplocation.net/, to determine the cell phone provider for a mobile device.

Case study
In an effort to avoid apprehension, many criminals monitor high-profile investigations to stay ahead of the most recent investigative technology. Many criminals utilize social media and mobile phone applications for communication. Naively, they believe that law enforcement cannot obtain their social media communication records.

In August 2020, law enforcement responded to a shooting homicide that occurred in a grassy, isolated area. While there were no witnesses to the homicide, investigators determined that the victim had communicated with an unknown subject, through a social media application, just prior to the homicide. Investigators served a search warrant on the social media application, which yielded the IP addresses associated with the unknown subject’s device. Additionally, the IP addresses were assigned to a mobile phone provider.

Investigators served a search warrant on the mobile phone provider. Through the service of the search warrant, investigators obtained the unknown subject’s device information, phone number, and identity. Subsequently, investigators served a search warrant for CDR, which provided them with the evidence needed to make an arrest.

The value of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Time-of-Arrival (TOA) records
As previously discussed, CDR records and location-based records are obtainable when a suspect’s mobile phone number or mobile device identifiers are known. Suppose law enforcement is unable to identify the suspect’s mobile phone number. Cell phone providers retain cell tower information, which is available to law enforcement through a court order. This information, referred to as a tower dump, can provide law enforcement with an abundance of information. Tower dumps are essentially a “dump” of all data from a specific cell phone tower, on a specific date, at a specific time. This data is helpful during the investigation of single crimes, where law enforcement does not have a suspect, but has other information indicating that the suspect may have used their mobile phone during the commission of the crime.

Additionally, tower dumps preserve data, which law enforcement can use when a suspect is developed. When multiple crimes of the same modus operandi are committed in different locations, law enforcement can obtain tower dumps from cell towers that service the area surrounding the location of each crime. Investigators can compare the tower dump information in an effort to identify the mobile devices that were present on the same date, time, and location of the crimes.

Another less-known option for identifying a target device is an area search. Law enforcement can provide a cell phone provider with specific locations and request a search of these locations be completed. The providers will produce identifiable information for each device that was in each location at the specific time.

The quick and simple method to locate a known mobile device is called a “ping.” Law enforcement may contact a cell phone provider, through exigent circumstances or legal process, to compel the cell phone provider to send a silent signal to the target device. The silent signal reveals the location of the target device through GPS coordinates.

OnStar has the ability to locate OnStar-equipped vehicles, even if the OnStar subscription is inactive. According to OnStar they can provide law enforcement, with proper legal service, the GPS coordinates of the target vehicle, flash the vehicle’s lights, beep the horn, disable the ignition and bring the vehicle to a safe stop.

Technology revolutionizes industries, and law enforcement must embrace the power of this emerging innovation. Industries continue to identify and prioritize emerging technologies, which are researched and implemented into their current infrastructures. Law enforcement should parallel these surging innovations and adapt them to their investigations.

Read the original article HERE.

Burglars using jammers to disable wireless smart home security

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February 19, 2024 | Ernestas Naprys | CyberNews |

Wireless smart sensors and cameras may be “screaming” about broken glass, open doors, and burglars moving inside the house, but those radio signals may never reach the homeowner’s phone.

After a series of robberies in Edina, Minneapolis, police suspect that burglars are using WiFi jammers to block off security system signals such as wireless security cameras, KARE 11, the local television station, has reported. The jammers can also disable door, window, and motion sensors.

Edina police believe that the suspects aren’t choosing houses at random –they’re researching carefully prior to burglarizing them. The suspects are stealing jewelry, safes, and high-end merchandise.

“It’s believed the burglars are not violent and tend to choose unoccupied houses,” the police’s report reads.

At the city safety meeting on January 31st, residents warned about the burglars using WiFi jammers to impact security systems, especially surveillance cameras.

Many home security devices connect directly to the WiFi network or a smart home hub using radio frequencies such as 2.4 GHz. Their signal strength is limited and is susceptible to interference.

Jammers can overpower signals from security devices by sending a “loud” noise in the same range of frequencies. For receivers, it’s then impossible to distinguish between the genuine signals and the disruptive noise generated by the jammers.

The use of jammers in the United States is banned by the Federal Communications Commission, as they can prevent people from making 911 and other emergency calls, pose serious risks to public safety communications, and interfere with other forms of day-to-day communications.

“The use of a phone jammer, GPS blocker, or other signal jamming device designed to intentionally block, jam, or interfere with authorized radio communications is a violation of federal law,” the FCC said in an alert. The use or marketing of a jammer in the US may subject you to substantial monetary penalties, seizure of the unlawful equipment, and criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.”

Yet, the jammers can be bought online, usually from suppliers outside the US, and their price ranges depending on their power, usually between $40 to $1,000, KARE 11 reported.

Wired security devices, relying on physical connections, are generally less sensitive to outside interference. However, cables may also be sabotaged. Users may also check if their smart home solution allows alerts when signals or connections are interrupted.

Read the full, original article HERE.

Signal Finally Rolls Out Usernames, So You Can Keep Your Phone Number Private

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February 20, 2024 | By Andy Greenberg | WIRED |

FOR NEARLY A decade, cybersecurity professionals and privacy advocates have recommended the end-to-end encrypted communications app Signal as the gold standard for truly private digital communications. Using it, however, has paradoxically required exposing one particular piece of private information to everyone you text or call: a phone number. Now, that’s finally changing.

Today, Signal launched the rollout in beta of a long-awaited set of features it’s describing simply as “phone number privacy.” Those features, which WIRED has tested, are designed to allow users to conceal their phone numbers as they communicate on the app and instead share a username as a less-sensitive method of connecting with one another. Rather than give your phone number to other Signal contacts as the identifier they use to begin a conversation with you, in other words, you can now choose to be discoverable via a chosen handle—or even to prevent anyone who does have your phone number from finding you on Signal.

The use of phone numbers has long been perhaps the most persistent criticism of Signal’s design. These new privacy protections finally offer a fix, says Meredith Whittaker, Signal’s president. “We want to build a communications app that everyone in the world can easily use to connect with anyone else privately. That ‘privately’ is really in bold, underlined, in italics,” Whittaker tells WIRED. “So we’re extremely sympathetic to people who might be using Signal in high-risk environments who say, ‘The phone number is really sensitive information, and I don’t feel comfortable having that disseminated broadly.’”

In the new features—which are available in beta now, but which Signal plans to roll out in a more final version in the coming weeks—Signal has made three changes, one setting that’s now switched on by default and two that are opt-in features. First, by default, your phone number will no longer be visible in your Signal profile unless someone already has the number saved in their phone’s address book. Second, you can now choose to create and share a unique username, or a QR code that contains it, with anyone you want to connect with. Mine, for instance, is Andy.01. (Once someone does start messaging you, a little confusingly, they’ll see your chosen profile name instead of that username. That profile name, just as before in Signal, doesn’t have to be unique, and the person you’re interacting with can also change it in their own view of you in the app.)

The third new feature, which is not enabled by default and which Signal recommends mainly for high-risk users, allows you to turn off not just your number’s visibility but its discoverability. That means no one can find you in Signal unless they have your username, even if they already know your number or have it saved in their address book. That extra safeguard might be important if you don’t want anyone to be able to tie your Signal profile to your phone number, but it will also make it significantly harder for people who know you to find you on Signal.

The new phone number protections should now make it possible to use Signal to communicate with untrusted people in ways that would have previously presented serious privacy risks. A reporter can now post a Signal username on a social media profile to allow sources to send encrypted tips, for instance, without also sharing a number that allows strangers to call their cell phone in the middle of the night. An activist can discreetly join an organizing group without broadcasting their personal number to people in the group they don’t know.

In the past, using Signal without exposing a private number in either of those situations would have required setting up a new Signal number on a burner phone—a difficult privacy challenge for people in many countries that require identification to buy a SIM card—or with a service like Google Voice. Now you can simply set a username instead, which can be changed or deleted at any time. (Any conversations you’ve started with the old username will switch over to the new one.) To avoid storing even those usernames, Signal is also using a cryptographic function called a Ristretto hash, which allows it to instead store a list of unique strings of characters that encode those handles.

Amid these new features designed to calibrate exactly who can learn your phone number, however, one key role for that number hasn’t changed: There’s still no way to avoid sharing your phone number with Signal itself when you register. The fact that this requirement persists even after Signal’s upgrade will no doubt rankle some critics who have pushed Signal’s developers to better cater to users seeking more complete anonymity, such that even Signal’s own staff can’t see a phone number that might identify users or hand that number over to a surveillance agency wielding a court order.

Whittaker says that, for better or worse, a phone number remains a necessary requisite as the identifier Signal privately collects from its users. That’s partly because it prevents spammers from creating endless accounts since phone numbers are scarce. Phone numbers are also what allow anyone to install Signal and have it immediately populate with contacts from their address book, a key element of its usability.

In fact, designing a system that prevents spam accounts and imports the user’s address book without requiring a phone number is “a deceptively hard problem,” says Whittaker. “Spam prevention and actually being able to connect with your social graph on a communications app—those are existential concerns,” she says. “That’s the reason that you still need a phone number to register, because we still need a thing that does that work.”

The continued phone number requirement means Signal’s privacy upgrade is a compromise, says Matthew Green, a professor of cryptography and computer science at Johns Hopkins University who has in the past consulted for both Google and Facebook in their implementation of Signal’s open source encryption protocol. “It’s a half solution,” says Green. “It’s not a perfect solution.”

Green notes, however, that even if it doesn’t satisfy the most die-hard privacy advocates, it represents a significant improvement for a much larger portion of Signal’s hundreds of millions of users. “There’s a legitimate community of people who wanted to use Signal without giving other people their phone numbers, and they’re going to be very happy with this change. And then there’s a more hardcore set of people who don’t want to ever give their number to Signal,” Green says. “I think getting a big set of people serviced is the right direction, and working on satisfying all the other people is something for Signal to keep working on.”

Signal doesn’t currently have any road map toward dropping its use of phone numbers as a registration mechanism, Whittaker concedes—she says for now, there’s no alternative that wouldn’t sacrifice Signal’s usability, which she argues would represent a net loss for privacy advocates. But she says that the new phone number privacy features are nonetheless Signal’s careful attempt to solve the problem phone numbers represent without losing the qualities that have made Signal popular in the first place.

Read the full, original article HERE.

AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon users hit by massive cellular outage in US

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February 22, 2024 | By Melissa Koenig | New York Post |

A major cellphone outage affected users across the US early Thursday — even stopping some police departments from being able to receive 911 calls.

AT&T seemed to have experienced the largest number of issues, with nearly 32,000 reports at around 4:30 a.m., according to data from DownDetector, which tracks outages by collating status reports from sources including user-submitted errors on its platform.

More than 800 service outages were also reported on T-Mobile and Verizon, although a spokesperson for the latter put it down to users reporting problems trying to call people with other services.

Others reported issues on smaller carriers including Boost Mobile, Consumer Cellular and Straight Talk Wireless.

The problems extended from New York, Boston, and Atlanta on the East Coast to Houston, Dallas, Los Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco — and even to Montreal in Canada.

Several police stations throughout the country even warned that people might be unable to call to report emergencies.

However, many AT&T users say they are stuck in “SOS Mode” in which they can only reach emergency services.

A spokeswoman for AT&T said the company is working “urgently to restore service.”

“We encourage the use of Wi-Fi calling until service is restored,” she said.

On Verizon and T-Mobile, spokespersons told The Post their networks are operating normally.

They suggested that the issues only arise when customers try to call or text those using AT&T, with a spokesperson from T-Mobile claiming: “Down Detector is likely reflecting challenges our customers were having attempting to connect to users on other networks.”

The spokesperson from Verizon added that its customers “experienced issues this morning when calling or texting with customers served by another carrier.

“We are continuing to monitor the situation,” the Verizon spokesperson said in a statement.

Yet many online have expressed their frustrations with the cellphone companies amid the ongoing outages.

“AT&T is literally one of the most expensive phone companies, and y’all have the audacity to have a service outage for hours with zero updates being given to your customers?” one customer wrote on X.

“Y’all got one hour to wrap this s–t up! Fix it and fix it now.”

Another called it “crazy.”

“It’s a whole outage going [on] in the US and a lot of people can’t text or call anybody, only number you can call is 911 … this is unusual and scary,” he wrote.

Some feared the widespread outages could be a cyberattack, with one techie saying he “can’t imagine this is incompetence or a single node failure.”

The cause of the outages, however, remains unclear.

The Post has reached out to AT&T and T-Mobile for comment.

Read the full, original article (with informative graphics) HERE.

AT&T says FirstNet provides more than 5.5 million connections to about 27,500 agencies

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January 26, 2024 | By Donny Jackson | Urgent Communications |

FirstNet provides more than 5.5 million connections to approximately 27,500 public-safety agencies subscribing to the nationwide public-safety broadband network (NPSBN) as of the end of 2023, according to figures released yesterday by AT&T, the FirstNet Authority contractor tasked with building and maintaining the system.

AT&T CFO Pascal Desroches noted the FirstNet adoptions as he highlighted the performance of the carrier’s Business Solution unit, which saw its wireless-services revenue grow almost 6% during the fourth quarter.

“This is an area where we continue to grow faster than our nearest peer,” Desroches said during AT&T’s conference call with financial analysts. “FirstNet also continues to be a growth vector for us, with wireless connections growing by about 260,000 sequentially.”

It is not clear how many of these FirstNet wireless connections represent full-fledged postpaid phone additions, but the FirstNet growth contributed to AT&T’s 526,000 total postpaid phone net additions for the fourth quarter of 2023. For the year, FirstNet adoption grew by 1.1 million connections and more than 3,000 public-safety agencies, while AT&T reported an increase of 1.7 million net postpaid phone additions in 2023.

These fourth-quarter figures represent a slowdown in the growth rate of the LTE-based FirstNet, as it marked the second consecutive quarter in which AT&T reported less than 300,000 new NPSBN connections and the first time in years that the number of public-safety agencies added during a quarter clearly dipped below the 1,000 mark.

Even with this recent decrease in its growth rate, the FirstNet adoption story continues to exhibit remarkable strength, particularly when compared to industry expectations that existed when the FirstNet Authority was created in 2012 and when AT&T was awarded the NPSBN contract in 2017.

During those years, many industry observers questioned how many subscribers FirstNet could ever attract, as the total number of traditional public-safety personnel—those working for fire, EMS and law-enforcement departments—in the U.S. was believed to be between 3 million and 4 million. In addition, several officials doubted that FirstNet would be able to gain significant amounts of subscribers until the 700 MHz Band 14 spectrum was deployed throughout a majority of the U.S., which was expected to take multiple years.

But AT&T accelerated this adoption timeline. When it was awarded the FirstNet contract in March 2017, the carrier announced that it would voluntarily provide FirstNet subscribers with priority and preemption services across all of its commercial spectrum bands supporting 4G LTE services, not just the 700 MHz Band 14 airwaves licensed to the FirstNet Authority.

In addition, FirstNet’s subscriber base not only includes traditional public-safety personnel—known as “primary” users—but also others who support and supplement public-safety efforts—known as “extended primary” users—such as utility, government, transportation, hospital and other critical-infrastructure employees.

Yesterday’s FirstNet adoption totals are the first figures shared since the FirstNet Authority last month announced that it has accepted AT&T’s initial five-year nationwide buildout of the NPSBN on the 20 MHz of 700 MHz Band 14 spectrum licensed to the FirstNet Authority.

This milestone marks the end of federal-government money—all of which came from FCC spectrum-auction proceeds—being paid to AT&T in association with FirstNet. Under the 2017 contract for the NPSBN, AT&T had the opportunity to earn as much as $6.5 billion by executing the initial five-year FirstNet buildout correctly and on time.

While the federal-government money allocated to FirstNet is gone, the FirstNet Authority should have plenty of funding through March 2042, when the current 25-year agreement with AT&T is scheduled to expire. Under the terms of the contract, AT&T is required to pay the FirstNet Authority annually an ever-increasing amount of money for the right to utilize the Band 14 spectrum for commercial purposes when it is not needed by public safety.

In total, AT&T is scheduled to pay $18 billion to the FirstNet Authority during the life of the 25-year contract. Of this total, less than $3 billion is expected to fund the FirstNet Authority’s operations. The remaining $15 billion is required to be utilized to pay for improvements to the FirstNet system, and only a small fraction of this discretionary funding has been utilized during the first seven years of the contract.

On Monday, FirstNet Authority board members are scheduled to meet, and the agenda calls for the board to listen to a “recommendation on network investments” and later vote on a “network evolution” resolution.

Read the original article HERE.